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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates if NFL teams maximize profits with respect to ticket price.  We modify 
Ferguson et al’s (1991) NHL paper as it pertains to the NFL.  A profit function incorporating 
variable revenue and cost factors such as gate receipts and player expenses is employed.  A 
systems model is used as the estimation procedure to identify the determinants of ticket prices for 
NFL franchises.  The model implies a Kuhn-Tucker based cross equation parameter restriction 
that result from attendance capacity constraints.  Results from the regression are then used in 
conjunction with other data to numerically test the first order necessary profit maximization 
conditions.  The results indicate that over 80% of NFL teams set ticket prices in a manner 
consistent with gate receipt and profit maximization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he theory of profit maximization has been a key economic concept for almost a century, Knight 
(1921).  Profit maximization occurs when firms adjust either the quantity or price of the goods they 
produce in order to maximize the gap between revenues and costs.  Professional sporting contests 
have been one of the most significant branches of the entertainment industry.  Szymanski (2003) reports that in 1997 
the U.S. Census Bureau found 41% of the population, roughly 110 million people, attended a spectator sporting 
event each year.  He also states that Kagan Media estimated the annual household television viewing of sports 
events to be 77 billion hours per year. 
 
According to Scully (1995) the National Football League (NFL) is an economic enterprise where every 
single team in the league is consistently profitable.  Zimbalist (2003) states that individual owner’s economic 
objectives differ due to the unique way each owner defines profit maximization.  Some owners focus simply on 
money, while others believe the best way to maximize profits is to maximize the number of wins.  Even though 
research conducted by Forbes shows that each team in the NFL makes a significant profit, it does not mean that each 
team maximizes potential profits.
i
  Constant sellouts and scalpers selling tickets above face value point to the fact 
that NFL franchises could raise ticket prices in order to increase profits. Perhaps some owners are more interested in 
winning championships than making the most money.  As long as franchises are not losing money, their ultimate 
goal could be the glory and prestige accompanying a Super Bowl victory.  On the other hand, constantly increasing 
ticket prices and television blackouts in local areas during non-sellout games all point to profit maximization as the 
main objective.  These conflicting empirical findings and stylized facts prompt the question: Do NFL franchises 
conform to the practices of profit maximization?  This paper will strive to answer that question. 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether NFL franchises set ticket prices in a manner consistent 
with the first order necessary profit maximizing conditions.  The first section will provide a review of the pertinent 
empirical literature on profit maximization.  The second section will outline the modifications to the methodology 
employed by Ferguson et al. (1991) and will develop empirical models for the maximization of gate receipts with 
respect to ticket prices.  Section three addresses the profit maximizing necessary conditions and presents the 
numerical equations used to test whether these conditions hold.  The fourth section will present the data and 
regression model.  The fifth section discusses the results for both the empirical model and the numerical testing of 
T 
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profit maximization.  Finally, the implications of the results are presented in the concluding section. 
 
CURRENT RESEARCH ON PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
 
While the theory of profit maximization has been around since the beginning of the 20
th
 century there have 
been relatively few studies that adapt this theory to professional sports leagues.  Several studies have focused on the 
economic design of these leagues and the relationship between variables affecting the business side of professional 
sports. 
 
There is a copious literature that covers studies on attendance, revenue, competitive balance, etc.  Brook 
(2006) provides an excellent summary of the literature on profit maximizing models and inelastic ticket pricing.  El-
Hodiri & Quirk (1971, 1974, and 1975) present the first model of a sports league.  Like us they focus on gate 
receipts alone.  Additional work by Heilmann & Wendling (1976) extended the El-Hodiri and Quirk effort to 
include additional revenue streams.  Marburger (1997) has modeled sports teams as multi-product monopolists that 
sell both admission and concessions.  Another vein of the literature examines the connection between ticket pricing 
and home field advantage.  The reader is directed to Brook (2006) for a review of these studies.   
 
None of the above studies account for the fact that attendance constraints in the NFL are often binding.  In 
2006 the NFL set a record with every game for every team selling out through the eleventh week of the season.  
Studies on game day attendance like the one by Welki and Zlatoper (1994) fail to account for the impact of such a 
constraint in their empirical specifications.  However, a study by Ferguson et al. (1991) examines if NHL teams 
maximized profits with respect to ticket prices given a seating constraint.   
 
Ferguson et al. (1991) investigate the issue of profit maximization in the National Hockey League (NHL) 
by looking at the ticket pricing behavior of teams given a stadium capacity constraint.  Their study asserts that 
pricing differences between various packages of seating support the idea that owners use sophisticated practices to 
earn profits. They assume that each team considers the fan’s willingness to pay for attendance.  The team then 
maximizes profits by setting seat prices accordingly to maximize its gate receipts.  Each team will have a different 
method for price setting due to unique franchise characteristics.  The econometric results, which use Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions through cross equation restrictions, offer considerable support for the notion that NHL teams do follow a 
profit maximizing procedure in setting ticket prices. 
 
The present study modifies the model proposed by Ferguson et al. (1991) to examine profit maximization 
as it applies to ticket pricing in the NFL.  To the best of our knowledge no economic studies conducted on profit or 
revenue maximization pertaining to the NFL subject to seating capacity constraints exist.  This study tests the 
necessary (first order) conditions of profit maximization to see if in the presence of a capacity constraint firms 
maximize gate receipts with respect to ticket prices.  The following section outlines the mathematical models 
derived for both profit and ticket prices which will serve as the foundation for testing profit maximization in the 
NFL. 
 
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: DERIVATION  
 
If owners maximize profits, they must pay close attention to the revenues generated and costs incurred 
throughout the season.   The revenue that a team receives accrues in two main forms.  The majority of revenue is 
collected from the gate receipts of each game.  Additional revenues arise from the teams’ share of NFL broadcasts 
and merchandise sales. Even though revenue sharing from NFL broadcasts and merchandise does make up a fairly 
significant part of a team’s total revenue, it is approximately a fixed amount from team to team.  The NFL signs 
contracts with national and local broadcasting agencies, Szymanski (2003).  The NFL allots a share of the revenue 
produced from sales of NFL merchandise to be distributed among teams in the league. The revenues generated by 
these contracts are divided equally among all teams.  The teams have virtually no control over the revenue they 
receive from league sharing.  Therefore, owners focus on gate receipts, which they can control.  Owners can set 
ticket prices to maximize profits for the season.  
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In keeping with Ferguson et al (1991), it is assumed that the costs varying with attendance at each 
individual game are so small that operating costs and stadium costs should not play a large role in profit 
maximization.  The majority of costs for each team stem from factors such as players salaries.  This implies that the 
owners’ sole objective is to maximize the difference between total gate receipts in each year and total player 
expenses.  To do this owners will adjust ticket prices until they find a price that returns maximum profit, π, given the 
amount spent on players.   The revenue generated by gate receipts is simply ticket price, p, multiplied by attendance, 
A.  Equation (1) gives the profit maximization rule for NFL owners. 
 
Max π = p*A - E    subject to   A < C (1) 
 
E represents total player expenses.  The maximum number of people that can attend any game is limited to the 
seating capacity, C, of the stadium.  
 
 Ticket price itself is a function of other variables.  In keeping with Ferguson et al (1991), this study will 
define ticket price as a function of attendance and a vector of other variables. However, it will also incorporate 
player expenses as a determinant of ticket price.  Equation (2) gives the ticket price function. 
 
p
x
 = ƒ (A, E, z;θ) (2) 
 
P
x
 is ticket price raised to the power x, z is the vector of exogenous attributes of the team, and θ is the vector 
parameters.  It is believed that both attendance and player expenses are endogenous variables.  Instrumental 
variables will be used to handle this endogeneity to ensure that the estimates are unbiased and consistent.  The 
instrumental variables will produce theoretical values for attendance and player expenses, which will be called  
and  respectively. Therefore, the inverse demand function from equation (2) is represented by equation (3). 
 
 (3) 
 
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) yields the profit function presented in equation (4).  Since profit 
maximization corresponds to revenue minus costs, equation (4) will be the basis for testing empirical hypotheses 
regarding profit maximization.   
 
EzEA xk 
 )1(
210 )(*      (4) 
 
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: TESTING METHODOLOGY 
 
A first order necessary condition for profit maximization is that the first order derivative with respect to the 
choice variable equals zero.  Equation (5) states that, the derivative of profit function with respect to attendance 
equals zero.  
 
 (5) 
 
The second order condition states that the second derivative must be negative with respect to the choice 
variable attendance A.   The derivative of ∂π/∂  must be taken with respect to attendance. The resulting expression 
is given by Equation (6). 
 
    (6) 
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As noted previously, stadium capacity places a restriction on the number of people attending a game.  This 
constraint must be taken into account.  To do this a univariate Kuhn-Tucker approach is used.  A maximum profit 
must be generated between zero and stadium capacity.   Therefore at the profit maximizing attendance, the following 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions must hold. 
 
 (7) 
 
These conditions imply the capacity constraint is binding unless local concavity exists.  This study uses the 
third condition in (7) to represent the restriction on owners’ choices because it is able to represent both the first and 
second conditions simultaneously. Thus the restriction equation is given by equation (8). 
 
 (8) 
 
Ferguson et al. (1991) use a similar restriction approach in their paper.  The effects of the theoretical 
determinants on ticket prices in the NFL will be determined empirically by estimating the following system of 
equations (9) and (10) that are the empirical versions of equations (3) and (8): 
 
 (9) 
 
   (10) 
 
In equations (9) and (10) i represents the observation and  and  are unobservable errors terms.  
Using the coefficients and determinants from these equations the first and second order derivatives can be 
numerically calculated and evaluated for both sellout and non-sellout teams.  The results of these calculations should 
shed some light on the maintained hypothesis of profit maximization, in the context of this paper, by NFL owners. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The dataset is comprised of all 32 NFL football teams over three regular seasons from 2003 to 2005.  The 
unit of observation is a single regular season for each team. The left hand side dependent variable in this model is 
the average ticket price by team for each season.
 ii
 Average ticket price was defined as a weighted average of season 
ticket prices for general and club-level seats for each team during a given season.  The weights used were the 
proportion of seats in each pricing category.  Ticket prices were then adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index. The explanatory variables are summarized in equation (11) and briefly defined in Table 1.   
 
PRICE
X
 = f(ATTEND, POP, WEALTH, PWIN, CWIN, ALTREC, 
STAR, PEXP, HHI, DIVISIONAL DUMMY VARIABLES,                (11) 
YEAR DUMMY VARIABLES) 
s.t. [(β1ATTEND/X)*PRICE^(1-X)+ PRICE] [CAP-ATTEND] = 0 
 
 
The definitions of the variables presented in the above model are displayed in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable                        Definition 
X Exponent value that PRICE was raised by 
PRICE Average game ticket price for season in 2003 dollars 
ATTEND Season home attendance 
POP Population of franchise’s home city 
WEALTH Median income of franchise’s home city in 2003 dollars 
PWIN End-of-year winning percentage for previous year 
CWIN End-of-year winning percentage 
ALTREC Alternative forms of local recreation available in home city 
STAR Number of Pro Bowl selections 
PEXP Total player expenses in 2003 dollars 
HHI Yearly HHI in the NFL 
CAP Stadium Capacity 
NFCE Dummy for division NFC East 
NFCN Dummy for division NFC North 
NFCS Dummy for division NFC South 
NFCW Dummy for division NFC West 
AFCE Dummy for division AFC East 
AFCN Dummy for division AFC North 
AFCS Dummy for division AFC South 
YEAR03 Dummy for 2003 season 
YEAR04 Dummy for 2004 season 
 
  
Attendance is also believed to be an endogenous variable in the model, and is therefore dependent on the 
exogenous variables.  The determinants that affect average ticket price also affect attendance.  Attendance 
(ATTEND) is defined as the total number of spectators at an NFL team’s home games for a given year.   All 
attendance data was found at the NFL’s website.iii  Lower ticket prices will allow more people to attend games 
through the usual income and substitution effects.  Therefore, the theoretical prediction is that attendance will have a 
negative relationship with price.  
 
 The costs of running a professional football team are not small.  Most of these costs are either operating 
expenses or player expenses.  We assume that operating costs, such as stadium operation and general management 
costs, do not vary by large amounts across NFL teams.  Since these costs are assumed to be fixed, and that data for 
them is not readily available, they are excluded from the model.  However, expenses such as player and coach 
salaries, benefits, and bonuses do differ throughout the league.  Even though there is a salary cap in the NFL, player 
expenses (EXP) vary significantly for each team.  Like attendance, player expenses are believed to be endogenous in 
the model.  Player expense data was collected from the NFL Team Valuations conducted by Forbes.
 iv
 They were 
then adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  When teams spend more on their players and staff 
they should theoretically have to bring in more revenue to offset the increased cost.  To accomplish this ticket prices 
should increase. This is why we expect average ticket price and player expenses to be positively related.   
 
El-Hordiri (1971) says that the league typically gives exclusive rights to organize a team in a 35-75 mile 
geographical area around the home playing field. Particular demographics in each territory represented by a NFL 
team are potential determinants of NFL ticket prices and other endogenous variables.  The total population (POP) of 
a territory should directly affect the number of fans wanting to attend home games.  A larger population creates a 
greater demand for tickets, allowing owners to raise prices, leading to greater revenue.  Population may be positively 
correlated with ticket prices in the NFL. Populations of the various NFL territories were collected from the US 
Census Bureau’s 2000 census.v 
 
 Ferguson et al. (1991) find per capita income and ticket prices to be positively correlated in the NHL, 
showing attending NHL games to be a normal good.  We also expect wealth to have a positive correlation with 
ticket prices because NFL tickets should be a normal good.  Median income (WEALTH) data was collected from the 
US Census Bureau’s 2000 census and then adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.vi 
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The number of different professional sports teams in each territory (ALTREC) represents the possible 
substitutes for attending an NFL football game.  Multiple sports teams may act as substitutes for each other. NFL 
football games are a source of entertainment and compete with other local entertainment for people’s time and 
money. If this is the case the greater the number of sports teams in an area the lower the attendance of NFL games.  
On the other hand multiple sports teams may be evidence of complementary preferences of consumers.  Cities with 
more sports teams may have a larger demand for sports and ceteris paribus, attendance at NFL events may be higher.  
A priori it is uncertain as to what type of impact the number of sports teams in an area will have on the ticket prices 
and revenue in the NFL.  The measure of alternative forms of recreation is captured by the number of major league 
teams in a particular territory from the four major U.S. professional sports leagues: MLB, NBA, NHL, and the NFL. 
 
There is a significant literature on the connection between winning and attendance.  People prefer to watch 
winning teams because they attract attention. A winning team should have not only a consistent fan base but a 
growing one because current fans will continue to support their team and people who were not previously fans might 
now be attracted to the team. The success of an individual team should play a significant role in determining the 
prices charge for game day attendance. In any given year, the greater the success of a team, the more people will 
want to attend games.  The performance of a team in the previous year will also affect attendance for the current 
year.  If a team did well last year, people will expect another good season and eagerness to attend at the upcoming 
season’s games will rise. In both cases, past and present, these factors increase the demand for attendance and can 
lead to changes in ticket prices. We will attempt to represent the success of NFL teams by using winning 
percentages. These annual winning percentages are calculated by dividing the number of games won by the number 
of games played.  Both the current year’s winning percentage (CWIN) and the previous year’s winning percentage 
(PWIN) were collected for each team over all three years.
vii
  We expect that team winning percentage of the 
previous and current year will vary positively with ticket prices. 
 
Downward and Dawson (2000) state, the profits a team achieves can start to fall if the team becomes “too” 
successful. If a team becomes so good that opposing teams have little chance of winning, fans will become bored 
and not want to attend games.   The same applies for teams who are so bad they consistently lose.  El-Hodiri and 
Quirk, (1971), state that predicable outcomes in sporting events lower attendance.  In light of this it is necessary to 
control for the impact of competitive balance of the NFL on attendance.  
 
Past empirical research on profit maximization has not taken competitive balance into account.  This study 
will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) specified in Larsen et al.(2006) to control for the impact of 
competitive balance on attendance in the NFL.  The HHI is most commonly used to examine market concentration 
in industrial organization, but it is also applicable to competitive balance. In this study the HHI is used to measure 
how equally wins are distributed among teams in the NFL.  The HHI measures the total number of wins in a season 
by an individual team in comparison to the total of number of wins throughout the entire league. In a season with a 
lack of competitive balance the HHI will be close to 1.  If wins are divided evenly throughout the league, then the 
HHI will be closer to 0 than in a league where a few teams win most of the games.  The HHI is defined in equation 
(12). 
 
 (12) 
 
 is the number of games won by team t, N is the number of teams in the league, and G is the number of games 
played by each team during a season.  If the NFL does not have competitive balance, resulting in a higher value of 
HHI, then attendance at games should fall.  A more equal distribution of wins should increase attendance and raise 
ticket prices.  Therefore the maintained hypothesis is that HHI should be negatively related to ticket prices. 
 
Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (1998) suggested an organization could shift the focus from a team’s poor 
performance towards individual star players in order to increase attendance.  We capture the star power of a team by 
the number of players representing the team at that year’s Pro-Bowl.  The NFL Pro Bowl is a yearly game played 
after the end of each season.  Fans, players, and coaches all vote for their favorite players at each position.  Players 
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with the most votes are selected to represent their conference in the NFL Pro Bowl.  Typically these players are 
regarded as the best players in the league.  Therefore, it seems logical that the players voted into the Pro Bowl from 
an individual team (STAR) will draw fans to games to witness their exciting athletic performances.  NFL teams with 
high star power should have higher attendance figures, allowing owners to increase ticket prices.  We expect the 
number of Pro Bowl players on a local team to positively relate to ticket prices in a given year. 
 
Divisional games are oftentimes of great importance to teams and fans. Historical rivalries between 
divisional opponents create a strong sense pride, increasing the demand for attendance.  Cross section specific 
divisional effects are controlled for using a series of divisional dummy variables.  These variables (NFCE, NFCN, 
NFCS, NFCW, AFCE, AFCN, AFCS) take on a value of 1 if the team being observed is part of a specific division.  
Otherwise it will have a value of 0.  There are eight divisions in the NFL with four in both the National Football 
Conference and the American Football Conference. We employ seven divisional dummy variables.   
 
 Every year brings about unforeseen changes due to external forces that could factor into the endogenous 
variables.  An example would be hurricane Katrina causing the New Orleans Saints to play in Baton Rogue and San 
Antonio for the 2005 season.  Time specific effects will be taken into account by using a dummy variable to 
represent two of the three years being observed (YEAR03, YEAR04).  A value of 1 is given to any observation 
occurring in that year, otherwise it is 0.   
 
 Attendance at an NFL game is unlike other goods in that there is a limit on the quantity of seats.  The total 
number of people allowed to attend a NFL football game has a ceiling restriction placed on it.  Every stadium in the 
NFL has a certain capacity that it theoretically cannot exceed. The total number of seats in each stadium (CAP) will 
therefore be used as a restriction in the model.
viii
  Using a capacity restraint allows the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be 
enforced through the restriction equation.  Ferguson et al. (1991) used the same approach in their study. However, 
data showed that some teams had total attendance greater than stadium capacity.  If this was the case, capacity was 
increased so that total attendance equaled stadium capacity.  With these teams now considered sell out teams, the 
ceiling constraint of the Kuhn-Tucker condition becomes binding.  Therefore, depending on the observation, either 
the internal or ceiling constraint should be binding. In keeping with Ferguson et al. (1991) since capacity is only 
used as a restriction, its effects on ticket prices will not be measured.  
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND NUMERICAL TESTING: ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
In order to incorporate both the instrumental variable and the restriction equation, a System Two-stage 
Least Squares (STSLS) regression approach was used to estimate the model.  ATTEND was instrumented for by the 
variable POP.
ix
 This primary OLS regression found the portions of the endogenous and exogenous variables that 
could be attributed to the instrumental variable.  The fitted values produced by this regression were saved for later 
use.  
 
The restriction equation on capacity of the stadium is simultaneously applied to enforce the cross equation 
restrictions.  Therefore, the results of this regression were the coefficients that best estimated both the inverse 
demand model and the restriction equation. 
 
The Arizona Cardinals were removed from the dataset to insure that the residuals were normally 
distributed.  Removing this outlier corrected the non-normality of the error term, producing a Jarque-Bera statistic 
below 5.99.  HHI was dropped from the model because including it as a regressor resulted in the singleton dummy 
problem. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the STSLS regression results for the determinants of ticket prices in the NFL.  The t-
statistics are displayed in parentheses below each coefficient.  A blank cell represents the omission of a variable 
from the model.  
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Table 2: System Two-Stage Least Squared Regression Results: The Determinants of Ticket Price 
Variable Definition Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
X Exponent value that PRICE was raised by 1 1.76 1.8 
     
C  66.82 890.99 - 
  (4.74)* (1.48) - 
ATTEND Season home attendance (endogenous) -9.99E-05 -0.0023 -0.0009 
  (-55.22)* (-2.07)* (-2.06)* 
POP Population of franchise’s home city IV IV IV 
  - - - 
WEALTH 
Median income of franchise’s home city in 
2003 dollars 5.81E-05 0.0021 0.0026 
  (3.38)* (5.68)* (6.75)* 
PWIN 
End-of-year winning percentage for 
previous year 9.49 364.43 446.04 
  (1.64) (3.05)* (3.39)* 
CWIN End-of-year winning percentage 4.86 200.06 229.74 
  (0.69) -1.36 (1.90) 
ALTREC 
Alternative forms of local recreation 
available in home city 2.31 77.21 93.67 
  (2.50)* (3.95)* (4.55)* 
STAR Number of Pro Bowl selections 0.08 -0.11 - 
  (0.11) (-0.01) - 
PEXP Total player expenses in 2003 dollars 3.54E-09 4.57E-07 - 
  (0.031) (0.19) - 
HHI Yearly HHI in the NFL - - - 
  - - - 
CAP Stadium Capacity restriction restriction restriction 
  - - - 
NFCE Dummy for division NFC East 5.89 175.57 108.40 
  (1.37) (-1.72) (1.31) 
NFCN Dummy for division NFC North -0.65 11.39 - 
  (-0.16) (0.13) - 
NFCS Dummy for division NFC South -3.22 -108.74 -124.15 
  (-0.75) (-1.22) (-1.64) 
NFCW Dummy for division NFC West -5.39 -176.49 -188.25 
  (-1.28) (-2.01)* (-2.26)* 
AFCE Dummy for division AFC East 4.96 189.05 149.68 
  (1.13) (1.84) (1.74) 
AFCN Dummy for division AFC North 0.01 2.57 - 
  (0.02) (0.03) - 
AFCS Dummy for division AFC South -3.37 -94.87 - 
  (-0.82) (-1.11) - 
YEAR03 Dummy for 2003 season -2.83 -101.25 -114.56 
  (-1.14) (-1.98)* (-2.06)* 
YEAR04 Dummy for 2004 season -2.07 -82.23 -99.97 
  (-0.86) (-1.66) (-1.79) 
R-squared  0.28 0.42 0.48 
*Significant at a 5% significance level, (t-critical = 1.96) 
 
  
The fit of model 1 is relatively low.  It explains only 28% of the variation in the dependent variable PRICE.  
Only ATTEND, ALTREC, and WEALTH are significant at the 5% level.  The fact that previous research by 
Ferguson et al. (1991)
 
and Boyd and Boyd (2001) found similar variables to be significant questions the 
specification of Model 1.   
 
In Model 2, PRICE is raised by an exponential factor of 1.76.  Model 2 explains 42% of the variation in 
PRICE around its mean given that only three years of data and 93 observations were used. Six independent variables 
were significant at the 5% significance level.   
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Model 3 has the best fit of any model tested with the model explaining just below half the variation in 
PRICE.  Even though this model had the best fit, it probably suffers from omitted variable bias.  Work by Boyd and 
Boyd (2001)
 
and Ferguson et al. (1991)
 
found these omitted variables to be significant determinants of ticket prices 
and attendance.  The significance of variables in the regression is downplayed by Ferguson et al (1991) because they 
claim that the testable implications of the theory are based on first and second order conditions. However, as a rule 
of thumb, standard errors of composite statistics (i.e. say those constructed from standard errors of regression 
coefficients that are significant) are more likely to be significant than those based on insignificant regression 
coefficients.  For this reason we present the results from Model 2 for inference. 
 
 This study found attendance (ATTEND) to have a negative and statistically significant impact on ticket 
prices. The fact that the partial coefficient was negative is central to the theory of profit maximization.  The demand 
for attending an NFL game is a normal good such that as ticket prices go up fewer people are willing to pay to watch 
the game. The fact the partial coefficient for ATTEND was significant is extremely important because it plays a 
major role in analyzing the first and second profit maximizing conditions.  If this partial coefficient was not 
significant, the results of the numerical analysis would not be credible.   
 
Estimation found PEXP to have a positive but insignificant relationship with PRICE.  This positive 
relationship was as expected.  Based on the estimation, the inclusion of PEXP in this model was not as necessary as 
originally thought.  It’s not certain why PEXP doesn’t play a larger role in determining ticket price.  Perhaps the fact 
that the NFL has a salary cap reduces the significance of player expenses.   
 
When examining the effects different characteristics of a team’s territory, the partial coefficient for 
WEALTH was found to be statistically significant and positively related to average ticket price. This result suggests 
that attending NFL games is a normal good. The other territorial variable POP was used as an instrumental variable 
and was therefore not estimated as a determinant of ticket prices.  
 
The number of different professional sports teams in an NFL team’s territory (ALTREC) was found to have 
a statistically significant and positive relationship with PRICE. Based on these results it seems that other teams in a 
certain territory don’t compete as substitutes, but instead increase the pride fans have for teams in their territory. 
This research has found that ALTREC actually increases support of a NFL team because people in the territory take 
pride in the teams representing them.   This pride increases the demand for attendance and therefore owners are able 
to charge higher ticket prices.  
 
 The coefficient of the winning percentages for NFL teams is positive and significant for PWIN and positive 
and insignificant for CWIN.  These two winning percentages were used to analyze the effects of team success. The 
values for PWIN show the more a team wins in the previous season, the higher ticket prices will become the 
following year. This means prior team success does play a significant role in determining ticket prices.  The 
insignificant result for CWIN was somewhat expected. An owner has to set ticket prices before the season begins.  
He doesn’t know exactly how well his team will perform in the upcoming season and can only use a predicted value 
of success.  Sometime this predicted value is inaccurate. Since the actual value of CWIN is not readily available to 
the owner at the time he makes his ticket pricing decision it is not surprising that CWIN does not play a significant 
role in determining these prices.  
 
 STAR has a negative, but insignificant relationship with ticket price.  This result contradicts the expected 
positive relationship.  However, the insignificance of this partial coefficient means the validity and accuracy are 
questionable.   
 
 Of the dummy variables used to represent the divisional effects in the NFL, only the partial coefficient of 
the NFC Western Division (NFCW) showed significance in the regression.  Every other division’s partial coefficient 
was insignificant at the 5% significance level and was not analyzed in detail.  
 
 The other set of dummy variables used in this data set accounted for the different seasons of the NFL.  The 
2003 season variable (YEAR03) was significant and negatively related to ticket prices. The 2004 season’s variable 
(YEAR04) also had a negative, yet insignificant, relationship with price.  The 2005 season did not have a dummy 
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variable, so it is assumed its partial coefficient value is 0, which is greater than YEAR04.  This increasing trend in 
the partial coefficient from year to year shows that ticket prices have risen on average in every season.  
 
 Following the regression, equations (5) and (6) were used to determine the first and second order 
derivatives for each observation.  The values for the derivatives were calculated by plugging in the individual A and 
P values found in each observation’s data set and the  and x values determined by Model 2.  Table 3 shows the 
results of this analysis for every team in the NFL over all three seasons. These results were then checked for 
significance by conducting a t-statistic test. The t-statistics for the first and second-order derivatives had to be 
derived by hand and numerically calculated.  When developing these t-statistics the methods outlined in Goldberger 
(1964) were used to calculate the standard error for each derivative. The Delta Method, outlined in Davidson and 
McKinnon (2004), was also used in order to approximate the standard error of a nonlinear function that occurred in 
the second-order derivative’s t-statistic. The Delta Method incorporates Taylor’s Theorem in order to produce a 
linear approximation of the nonlinear function, from which the standard error of the original nonlinear function can 
be approximated. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each derivative value. These t-statistics test the 
null hypothesis that the derivative value is not equal to zero.  If the t-statistic value is greater than the t-critical value 
of 1.96 for 5% significance level, then the derivative value is significantly greater than zero.     
 
The values reported in Table 3 were used to test the following conditions of profit maximization shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Conditions of Profit Maximization 
 
First-Order Profit Maximization Condition 
i)  =0 for non-sellout team 
ii)  > 0 for sellout teams 
 
Second-Order Profit Maximization Condition 
i)  < 0 for non-sellout teams 
ii)  unrestricted for sellout teams 
 
  
The first-order conditions of profit maximization are very strongly supported by the estimation results 
provide in Table 3.  Numerical evaluation showed that all sellout teams had a first derivative that was greater than or 
equal to zero.  This means every single sellout team satisfied the first-order condition necessary for profit 
maximization. 11 out of 28 sellout teams had a positive first derivative that was significantly greater than zero at the 
5% significance level.  The other 17 sellout teams all had positive first derivatives that were not significantly 
different from zero.    
 
The fact that every sellout team had a positive derivative that satisfied the profit maximization condition 
questions the biasness of the t-statistic test.  If the t-statistic test was biased, this test of the profit maximizing 
conditions would not be valid.  However, these suspicions are dispelled by the fact that non-sellout teams’ first 
derivatives take on both positive and negative values. Also, some of these second derivatives fail to accept the profit 
maximization conditions. 
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Table 3: Numerical Results for the First and Second Derivatives of the Profit Function   *sellout season 
 2003 2004 2005 
Team ∂π/∂A  ∂π2/∂A2 ∂π/∂A  ∂π2/∂A2 ∂π/∂A  ∂π2/∂A2 
Arizona Cardinals 2.61  -0.0001999 2.66  -0.00020 8.28  -0.0001843 
 (0.125)  (-0.0091) (0.128)  (-0.0091) (0.423)  (-0.0100) 
Atlanta Falcons 19.46  -0.0001631 19.49  -0.000163 38.14  -0.000129 
 (1.200)  (-0.0124) (1.202)  (-0.0124) (2.815)  (-0.0173) 
Baltimore Ravens 19.63  -0.000156 25.73  -0.0001439 29.22  -0.0001376 
 (1.080)  (-0.0120) (1.504)  (-0.0133) (1.743)  (-0.0140) 
Buffalo Bills 22.07  -0.000159 25.41  -0.0001513 26.20  -0.0001502 
 (1.435)  (-0.0131) (1.686)  (-0.0139) (1.768)  (-0.0141) 
Carolina Panthers 18.11  -0.0001617 18.01  -0.0001618 20.72  -0.0001561 
 (1.0336)  (-0.0119) (1.024)  (-0.0118) (1.211)  (-0.0124) 
Chicago Bears 12.30 * -0.0001753 16.77 * -0.0001644 21.60 * -0.0001543 
 (0.664)  (-0.0108) (0.943)  (-0.0116) (1.274)  (-0.0126) 
Cincinnati Bengals 14.87 * -0.0001806 24.87 * -0.0001557 32.70 * -0.0001403 
 (0.947)  (-0.0116) (1.748)  (-0.0140) (2.476)  (-0.0163) 
Cleveland Browns 38.12  -0.0001328 -3.77  -0.0002271 -2.52  -0.000228 
 (3.192)  (-0.0185) (-0.175)  (-0.0082) (-0.122)  (-0.0083) 
Dallas Cowboys 20.04  -0.0001527 32.00  -0.0001325 31.98  -0.0001326 
 (1.082)  (-0.0121) (1.922)  (-0.0146) (1.920)  (-0.0146) 
Denver Broncos 3.73  -0.0001962 7.65  -0.0001857 13.55  -0.0001711 
 (0.180)  (-0.0093) (0.387)  (-0.0099) (0.730)  (-0.0109) 
Detroit Lions 27.87 * -0.0001456 31.54 * -0.0001391 40.06  -0.0001259 
 (1.855)  (-0.0144) (2.172)  (-0.0153) (2.976)  (-0.0178) 
Green Bay Packers 47.76 * -0.0001157 47.63 * -0.0001148 66.88 * -9.607E-05 
 (3.589)  (-0.0197) (3.563)  (-0.0196) (5.770)  (-0.0263) 
Houston Texans 2.19 * -0.0002047 2.34  -0.000212 23.18  -0.0001629 
 (0.108)  (-0.0091) (0.121)  (-0.0091) (1.707)  (-0.0139) 
Indianapolis Colts 25.96  -0.0001463 31.85  -0.0001328 38.78  -0.0001232 
 (1.484)  (-0.0133) (1.910)  (-0.0145) (2.469)  (-0.0162) 
Jacksonville Jaguars 24.80  -0.0001139 31.87  -0.0001324 38.69  -0.000123 
 (1.393)  (-0.0130) (1.897)  (-0.0145) (2.437)  (-0.0161) 
Kansas City Chiefs 32.17  -0.0002124 34.25  -0.0001407 33.49  -0.0001413 
 (2.494)  (-0.0164) (2.878)  (-0.0175) (2.730)  (-0.0170) 
Miami Dolphins 32.98  -0.000145 30.30  -0.0001396 35.98  -0.0001305 
 (2.202)  (-0.0155) (1.985)  (-0.0148) (2.475)  (-0.0163) 
Minnesota Vikings 23.82  -0.0001425 21.90  -0.000158 28.50  -0.0001448 
 (1.605)  (-0.0137) (1.389)  (-0.0123) (1.924)  (-0.0146) 
New England Patriots 11.25  -0.0001427 11.73  -0.0001857 20.85  -0.0001584 
 (0.655)  (-0.0107) (0.692)  (-0.0108) (1.271)  (-0.0126) 
New Orleans Saints 24.79  -0.0001296 34.46  -0.000134 34.17  -0.0001342 
 (1.547)  (-0.0134) (2.417)  (-0.0161) (2.373)  (-0.0160) 
New York Jets 3.61  -0.0001877 1.52  -0.0002115 4.94  -0.0002001 
 (0.189)  (-0.0093) (0.076)  (-0.0089) (0.256)  (-0.0095) 
NY Giants 21.09 * -0.000148 25.41  -0.0001493 29.93  -0.0001412 
 (1.291)  (-0.0126) (1.622)  (-0.0137) (2.001)  (-0.0148) 
Oakland Raiders 13.61  -0.0001761 27.84  -0.000145 33.71  -0.000135 
 (0.779)  (-0.0111) (1.829)  (-0.0143) (2.337)  (-0.0158) 
Philadelphia Eagles 1.17 * -0.0002099 5.239901 * -0.0001965 8.48 * -0.0001867 
 (0.057)  (-0.0089) (0.267)  (-0.0095) (0.446)  (-0.0101) 
Pittsburgh Steelers 33.03  -0.00013 29.93 * -0.0001319 28.30 * -0.0001336 
 (1.953)  (-0.0147) (1.623)  (-0.0137) (1.494)  (-0.0133) 
San Diego Chargers 2.61  -0.0001999 2.66  -0.00020 8.28  -0.0001843 
 (0.125)  (-0.0091) (0.128)  (-0.0091) (0.423)  (-0.0100) 
San Francisco 49ers 19.46  -0.0001631 19.49  -0.000163 38.14  -0.000129 
 (1.200)  (-0.0124) (1.202)  (-0.0124) (2.815)  (-0.0173) 
Seattle Seahawks 19.63  -0.000156 25.73  -0.0001439 29.22  -0.0001376 
 (1.080)  (-0.0120) (1.504)  (-0.0133) (1.743)  (-0.0140) 
St. Louis Rams 22.07  -0.000159 25.41  -0.0001513 26.20  -0.0001502 
 (1.435)  (-0.0131) (1.686)  (-0.0139) (1.768)  (-0.0141) 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers 18.11  -0.0001617 18.01  -0.0001618 20.72  -0.0001561 
 (1.0336)  (-0.0119) (1.024)  (-0.0118) (1.211)  (-0.0124) 
Tennessee Titans 12.30 * -0.0001753 16.77 * -0.0001644 21.60 * -0.0001543 
 (0.664)  (-0.0108) (0.943)  (-0.0116) (1.274)  (-0.0126) 
Washington Redskins 14.87 * -0.0001806 24.87 * -0.0001557 32.70 * -0.0001403 
 (0.947)  (-0.0116) (1.748)  (-0.0140) (2.476)  (-0.0163) 
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Non-sellout teams tend to support the first-order profit maximization condition but with some mixed 
results.  The first derivative should not differ significantly from zero for non-sellout teams, but in fact 17 out of the 
68 non-sellout teams actually have a significantly positive first derivative at the 5% significance level.  In the other 
51 non-sellout seasons the first derivative wasn’t significantly different from zero, and therefore satisfied the first-
order condition.  This means 75% of the non-sellout teams satisfy the first order conditions necessary for profit 
maximization. 
 
Of the 96 observations tested in the NFL during the 2003 through the 2005 season 79 out of 96 teams, or 
82%, produce first derivatives consistent with the first-order necessary profit maximization conditions.  This shows 
that a very high percentage of the first-order results are in accordance with the conditions outlined for the model.   
 
The results associated with the second-order profit maximization condition produced somewhat mixed 
results. Numerical evaluation showed every second derivative having a negative value that was not significantly 
different from zero.  While these values are completely acceptable for all sellout teams based on the second-order 
condition, they are unacceptable for non-sellout teams.  Although the second derivatives are negative, their 
insignificance questions their credibility.     
 
The second-order condition of profit maximization determines whether a certain price level is profit 
maximizing or minimizing.  If the value is negative, the price level is closer to the profit maximizing position.  If it 
is positive, the price level is closer to a profit minimizing position. Even though the second derivatives are not 
significantly different from zero, the fact that they all have negative values supports the theory that they are closer to 
a profit maximizing position.  Also, given that research by Forbes found all NFL franchises to be making a positive 
profit, it is hard to believe that any NFL franchise would be operating at a profit minimizing position.
x
  Therefore, 
this study concludes all teams are setting ticket prices at a level consistent with profit maximization, not profit 
minimization.  Even though the second-order derivatives do not fully support this statement, other sources of 
information overcome the non-supportive second derivative results. 
 
CONCLUSIONS   
 
 This study has attempted to determine if NFL franchises act in a manner consistent with profit maximizing 
behavior by setting ticket prices at a level corresponding to the profit maximization conditions.  Adapting the 
methodology developed by Ferguson et al. (1991), profit maximization is tested by focusing on the gate receipts 
generated by ticket prices and attendance at NFL football games. 
 
 We find that results produced through numerical testing of the first and second order derivatives of our 
profit model offer strong support for the hypothesis that NFL franchises act in accordance with profit maximizing 
behavior. These findings go against the notion that franchises always try to win the most games as possible.  
Winning, although related to profit, is definitely not the only thing on the mind of NFL owners.  This evidence 
suggests that behavior of professional sport franchises may reflect the same profit maximizing approach seen in 
other competitive market industries. Perhaps professional sports leagues display more microeconomic characteristics 
seen in other competitive industries than previously thought. The findings of this research provide a potential 
gateway towards future microeconomic research in the area of professional sports.   
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1
   Research by Forbes has shown that NFL franchises consistently produce positive revenues and operating 
incomes.  They also have a debt to value ratio below 1.  All of which point to NFL franchises being profit-making 
entities.  This data can be retrieved from: http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/31/football-valuations-charts_05nfl.html 
2
   Average ticket price calculated by Team Marketing Report was retrieved from: 
http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm?page=fci_nfl_03.cfm.  
3
   NFL team attendance data was retrieved from: http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/attendance 
4
   Player expense data was retrieved from:  http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/31/football-valuations-
charts_05nfl.html 
5
   Median income data for metropolitan statistical areas was retrieved from: 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=DEC&_submenuId=factsheet_1&_lang=en
&_ts=.  
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6
   Population data for metropolitan statistical areas was retrieved from: 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=DEC&_submenuId=factsheet_1&_lang=en
&_ts=.  
7
   Team records recording both wins and losses were retrieved from: http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/standings 
8
   Stadium capacities were retrieved from: http://www.stadiumsofnfl.com/capacity.htm.  
9
   PEXP was found to be insignificant when regressed against PRICE, and was therefore uncorrelated with the 
residuals.  PEXP was used as an exogenous variable from then on and required no instrumental variable. 
10
   See Footnote #1  
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Research by Forbes has shown that NFL franchises consistently produce positive revenues and 
operating incomes.  They also have a debt to value ratio below 1.  All of which point to NFL 
franchises being profit-making entities.  This data can be retrieved from: 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/31/football-valuations-charts_05nfl.html 
ii
 Average ticket price calculated by Team Marketing Report was retrieved from: 
http://www.teammarketing.com/fci.cfm?page=fci_nfl_03.cfm.  
iii
 NFL team attendance data was retrieved from: http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/attendance 
iv
 Player expense data was retrieved from:  http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/31/football-
valuations-charts_05nfl.html 
 
vi
 Population data for metropolitan statistical areas was retrieved from: 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=DEC&_submenuId
=factsheet_1&_lang=en&_ts=.  
vii
 Team records recording both wins and losses were retrieved from: 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/standings 
viii
 Stadium capacities were retrieved from: http://www.stadiumsofnfl.com/capacity.htm.  
ix
 PEXP was found to be insignificant when regressed against PRICE, and was therefore 
uncorrelated with the residuals.  PEXP was used as an exogenous variable from then 
orequired no instrumental variable. 
 
